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This thesis explored the role of the independent peace movements in the 
German Democratic Republic in the early 1980s. It specifically examined three 
leaders of these movements: Rainer Eppelmann, Frank Eigenfeld, and Vera 
Wollenberger. Their work helped create the much larger dissident actions of 1989 by 
increasing the level of ''free space" provided in various Lutheran parishes in East 
Germany. This expansion occurred in spite of the formation of the GDR Peace 
Council, which the state used in an attempt to quell opposition by politicizing peace. 
Their efforts were examined by looking at English translations of GDR Peace Council 
works, which often exaggerated their goals, actions, and the level of participation. 
The thesis also discussed the role of Ostpolitik and the early 1980s arms race between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. The latter was the initial inspiration for the 
independent peace movements, even as it demonstrated that the German Democratic 
Republic often did not strive for peace, especially when its allies were a factor in state 
diplomacy. 
The role of the early 1980s independent peace movements has been largely 
absent from the historiography of the German Democratic Republic. The activities of 
1989 have overshadowed the important precursors, such as the independent peace 
movements. Many of the leaders of these movements later became influential figures 
in the actions of 1989. The independent peace movements taught them important 
skills that they transferred from leading small groups in 1979-1983 to larger groups in 
1989. The independent peace movements provided East German citizens with a 
public forum where they discussed their concerns and wishes. Their main goals were 
peace and the internal reform of the German Democratic Republic. 
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In 1989, the German Democratic Republic collapsed after widespread 
demonstrations. Prior to these protests, small movements had grown in the early 
1980s that laid the groundwork for the large-scale demonstrations of 1989. 
Throughout the 1980s in East Germany, three primary issues or causes, peace, human 
rights, and the environment, had rallied people together in spite of the constant threat 
of Stasi harassment, imprisonment, and possible torture. The earliest of these crusades 
were the anti-nuclear peace movements of the early 1980s. These set the precedent for 
"free space" within many Lutheran churches and established that a certain level of 
dissidence could exist, especially when the protestors took adequate precautions, such 
as alerting the Western media to their planned activities, though doing so might 
undermine their ultimate goals because the movements would be going outside the 
GDR, and the media could also put their own spin on events. 
It is necessary to emphasize one crucial detail: the independent peace 
movements were plural entities. The majority did not have contact with each other 
and due to the level of state control, only limited networking could be established 
among them. In addition to this factor, many of the movements started because they 
desired reform within the system. For this reason, most did not attempt to contact 
other groups because they thought more in terms of local changes. Two new goals, 
protection from physical harm and the desire to leave East Germany permanently, 
along with one large governmental concession allowing more citizens to emigrate, 
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especially in 1984, ultimately led to the demise of the early 1980s peace movements, 
but they nevertheless ended up having significant effects on East German citizens and 
society. 
The first changing objective was the importance of evading torture and 
imprisonment. From about 1978 until 1982, most of the protestors either did not 
entirely understand or did not care about the large possibility for personal harm. As 
arrests and harassment increased, some movements decided to use the publicity 
afforded by the Western media to protect themselves from the government. While this 
tactic was quite successful, it also meant that the original goal of most movements, 
reform from within the country, was lost because external media involvement often 
distorted the desires of the protestors. The second change was the desire of many to 
emigrate to West Germany. These people often became involved in the peace 
movements because they believed that participation in subversive activities could 
speed along the process. The potential emigrants were proven correct in their 
assumptions when the government changed its emigration allowance in 1984. 1 The 
levels were lowered in 1985 and returned to normal in 1987. The damage this 
migration did to the peace movements is a subject of controversy among historians 
and the former dissidents themselves. In some areas, the higher numbers of emigrants 
clearly damaged the movements, while in other areas there was little effect. Their 
1 
Numbers of emigrants from the German Democratic Republic in 1983: 11,343; 1984: 40,974; 1985: 
24,912; 1986: 26,178; 1987: 18,958. Source: Dirk Philipse� We Were the People: Voices From East 
Germany's Revolutionary Autumn of 1989 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993), 48. 
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strength in numbers no longer existed, and the government used this opportunity to 
create an official governmental peace movement, which began in 1983. 
This official German Democratic Peace Movement really took off in 1983 as 
the government siphoned off members of the independent peace movements. The 
government's peace movement used many of the same tactics as the independent 
movements, such as peace marches, rallies, and concerts, but governmental control 
was guaranteed by Stasi infiltration and mobilization of party faithful to participate. 
By taking over the cause of peace and calling for the end of nuclear weapons, the 
government managed to circumvent the independent peace movements. Anti­
nuclearization and peace became linked as issues advocated by the East German state, 
much like workers' rights. For this reason, the causes could no longer be used to 
demonstrate discontent with the East German government's policies and actions. 
In spite of their importance, East Gennany' s peace movements in the early 
1980s are largely missing in German historiography. The topic may warrant a few 
lines or perhaps a paragraph in works discussing German history, German peace 
movements, and actions leading to the collapse of the German Democratic Republic. 
Typically, the peace movements in the Federal Republic of Germany, social 
movements in the late 1960s throughout the Western world, and the late 1980s 
protests in East Germany, have contributed to overshadowing these important events. 
In spite of this current obscurity, East German peace movements were clearly 
important in the history of social movements in the country. If pockets of protest for 
peace were to be built and maintained, there had to be a meeting place. Many 
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Lutheran churches in East Germany provided this "free space. "2 This was because the 
Lutheran church's relationship with the East German government had been 
transformed several years previously, on March 6, 1978. 3 On this date, leaders of the 
Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR, or the Kirchenbund, which contained 
exclusively Lutheran preachers, met with Erich Honecker, leader of the German 
Democratic Republic, to discuss the future of the Lutheran church within East 
Germany. Prior to this meeting, the Lutheran church had encountered a variety of 
moods from the state: toleration, sporadic anti-religion campaigns in the late 1940s, 
and strong dislike by the government under Ulbricht from 1958 until 1971. When 
Honecker came to power in 1971, church-state relations worsened until 1973 when the 
state granted limited concessions to Lutheran churches after "its acceptance as a full 
voting member of the United Nations" possibly due to the role of the Lutheran 
churches "in gaining international recognition for the GDR.',4 Because of increased 
state support, the Lutheran church began to portray itself as a "church within 
socialism."5 This gradual return to toleration slowly led to rapprochement with 
Honecker at the March 1978 summit. Robert Goeckel argues in The Lutheran Church 
and the East German State that one of the main areas of concession was more freedom 
2 John P. Burgess, The East German Church and the End of Communism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 40-41. 
3 Robert F. Goeckel, The Lutheran Church and the East German State: Political Conflict and Change 
under Ulbricht and Honecker (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 2. 
4 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR: 1949-1989 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 107. 
5 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 3. 
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of assembly and an emphasis on better treatment for East Gennan citizens "regardless 
of world view and religious confession. ,,6 
The 1978 accord provided Lutheran churches with increased freedom, but this 
was not entirely without a cost to the churches. While the state did not control the 
churches externally, the East Gennan government did send Ministry of State Security, 
or Stasi, agents to attend and check on certain church meetings. 7 In addition to this 
internal review, the state (via the Stasi) used some Lutheran preachers as unofficial 
infonners. 8 Even with this new level of rapprochement, outward dissent and protest 
were nevertheless not allowed. Infonnal and fonnal meetings were assumed by 
participants to always be under surveillance by the Stasi. In spite of such measures, 
however, some Lutheran churches became umbrellas for numerous grassroots 
organizations.9 There are several reasons for this. One was that the Lutheran church 
had traditionally spoken out on issues that it viewed as important, especially with a 
biblical foundation, such as peace, nature, or the environment. 10 Another reason was 
individual pastors or church members, who had a strong desire to discuss certain 
issues, such as peace and the environment. These individuals drove the process of 
creating small groups that met in Lutheran churches to speak about such topics. The 
most likely reason was the debate among the Lutheran church hierarchy over what it 
6 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 245; 1-3, 241-246. 
7 
Barbara Miller, Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany: Stasi informers and their 
impact on society (New York: Routledge, 1999), 84-85; see also, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 109-115. 
8 
Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany, 15-84; see also, Karen Dawisha, Eastern 
Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), 147-148. 
9 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253. 
10 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 251-252. 
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meant to be a "church within socialism. "11 Many pastors believed that Lutheran 
churches had a duty to promote Christian ideals or causes, such as peace, even in a 
country with a dictatorial regime in power. The early grassroots movements focused 
on the environment in the 1970s and anti-nuclear disarmament and peace during the 
early 1980s. 12 
The level of participation by church officials in these movements is still 
debated. Some, such as Robert Goeckel, believe that the Lutheran church became a 
tool for networking and information gathering among these grassroots groups.13 
Others, like Frank Eigenfeld, a member of the Halle peace movement, argue that 
church leaders did not aid the movements, except by providing meeting spaces.14 The 
reality of the situation appears to be somewhere in between the assertions of these two 
camps of interpretation. Certain parishes, specifically those in Berlin, appear to have 
networked within the city and at times also in other areas. In the same period, other 
parishes, such as those in Halle, did not know about other peace movements until as 
late as 1980 and did not begin networking until 1983. 15 Church leaders' acceptance of 
these groups varied from parish to parish. There was no one cohesive independent 
peace movement, but instead numerous organizations throughout East Germany. 
Pastors led some movements, while others merely used church facilities as a meeting 
spot because of governmental tolerance. In every case, the level of surveillance was 
11 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 251. 
12 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253. 
13 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 253. 
14 We Were the People, 55. 
15 We Were the People, 43, 46. 
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unknown until members were arrested or tortured. In some cases, while Stasi 
informers were present, the agency decided the activities did not warrant intervention. 
Opinions also vary about the number of church informers who reported to the 
Stasi. Goeckel is very vague in his assessment of the situation. He states that '1he 
church functioned to channel rising grassroots dissent on this [ the independent peace 
movement] issue, thereby proving useful to a conservative regime interested in 
political stability without sacrificing ideological purity or loyalty to the USSR."16 
Goeckel does not explain how the Church provided information about opposition 
groups except for stating that subcommittees of the Kirchenbund worked with the state 
to deal with such issues. 17 He does not argue that church officials acted as unofficial 
informants for the Stasi. Goeckel also goes against most in arguing that the 
independent peace movement was a singular entity. Even with such apparent 
oversights, Goeckel provides a detailed account of the political situation that existed 
between the Kirchenbund and the East German government. 
Even aside from the Lutheran church's participatio°' certain other persuasive 
reasons existed for the creation of independent peace groups that turned into social 
movements in a dictatorial state. This leads to the question of what causes a social 
movement. Theories on the causes of social movements are extremely varied. As 
Alice Holmes Cooper discusses in Paradoxes of Peace, there are three primary 
arguments that must be examined when thinking about peace movements. The first, 
which is largely connected to Ronald lnglehart's scholarship, is the ''value change 
16 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 255. 
17 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 256. 
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school."18 This school "holds that value shifts take place across generations 
independently of their conscious experience."19 In lnglehart's model, there are two 
primary categories, "materialist" and "postmaterialist." A materialist values tangible 
forms of security while a postmaterialist prizes "social, aesthetic, and intellectual 
gratification."20 Using West Germany as an example for lnglehart's theory, one 
would suppose that a materialist would have lived through the scarcity of the end of 
World War II and the immediate postwar period, whereas a postmaterialist would have 
been born or grown up during the economic boom of the 1950s. Inglehart's theory 
largely fits the account of West Germany's protest movements in 1968 and later, as 
well as other forms of activism in western countries. Youths who were raised during 
uncommon economic prosperity did not have to worry about the existence or 
availability of basic material goods. For this reason, they focused on non-material 
ideas and causes. This argument stated that these postmaterialists had the time and 
energy to worry about higher ideals, and this led to increases in social activism. 
A second school was largely created from the theories of the German social 
philosopher Jurgen Habermas, who viewed "social movements as symptomatic of a 
crisis of modernity."21 Habermas argued that social movements arise in reaction to 
18 Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1996), 6. 
The work of Alice Holmes Cooper provided the information about the three primary social theories that 
were extremely helpful in analyzing the independent peace movements of the German Democratic 
Republic. While Holmes Cooper's work focuses strictly on the peace movements in the Federal 
Republic of Germany from the 1950s until the 1980s, her explanation of social theories was an 
invaluable tool in the analysis of the peace movements in the German Democratic Republic. 
19 Paradoxes of Peace, 6. 
20 
Paradoxes of Peace, 6. 
21 Paradoxes of Peace, 8. 
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new effects on peoples' lives emanating from advanced capitalism.22 Specifically, 
such movements arise when a new technological threat to society emerged. 23 This 
school contended that such a crisis existed in the 1 970s, pointing to nuclear weapons 
and pollution as threatening "the physical foundations of life, while destruction of 
traditional social settings undermined sources of meaning. "24 According to this 
school, the inability of the current political system to deal with such issues led people 
to discern a crisis. Those who recognized this state of affairs created or joined social 
movements in response. 25 Thus, Habermas' followers did not confine social activism 
to a particular generation but instead to a group that saw a crisis and shifted their 
values and actions in reaction to it. 
While the schools of Inglehart and Habermas sought a macro-level explanation 
of social movements in the 1 960s and later, others used micro-level or individual 
analysis to explain participation. Such examinations classified causes "ranging from 
cost-benefit analyses and the draw of group solidarity to feelings of personal efficacy 
and belief in group success."26 This third form of inquiry used individual responses to 
reconstruct groups by combining people who acted for similar reasons. Instead of one 
generation or "crisis-reacting" group, the individual analyses emphasized numerous 
theoretical groups whose only connection could be as limited as their belief that a 
particular movement could succeed in its goals, so they decided to participate in it. 
22 Paradoxes of Peace, 8. 
23 Paradoxes of Peace, 9. 
24 Paradoxes of Peace, 9. 
25 Paradoxes of Peace, 9. 
26 Paradoxes of Peace, 281 .  
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Numerous reasons existed for the creation and participation in social movements. The 
next chapter will examine a few of the primary reasons of those who joined such 
movements through case studies. 
These case studies, which make up Chapter 2, examine three important 
individuals, Rainer Eppelmann, Frank Eigenfeld, and Vera Wollenberger, in the 
various independent peace movements. Each of these people participated in and 
helped lead certain peace movements of the early 1980s. They all also encouraged, 
organized, and influenced the movements for reform that later occurred in 1988 and 
1989 in the German Democratic Republic. Their reasons for participating varied, 
though they each believed that the socialist system could be and needed to be changed. 
While the sources concerning their activism differed for the three, much of the 
information on Eppelmann and Eigenfeld came from interviews recorded by historian 
Dirk Philipsen. Numerous other secondary and primary sources were consulted to 
ensure that the accounts of the events discussed in the interviews were historically 
accurate. For Eppelmann, a letter he wrote to Erich Honecker, the leader of East 
Germany from 1971 until 1973, also provides specific evidence about his reasons for 
helping create an independent peace movement as well as the goals he hoped to 
accomplish through this group. Vera Wollenberger' s autobiography, which 
illuminated her participation in opposition movements and the eventual discovery that 
her husband had been a Stasi informer, provided most of the information for the third 
case study. Ag� other primary and secondary sources were examined to corroborate 
this material. 
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In addition to examining and analyzing case studies of the independent peace 
movements, the East German government's peace movement will also be explored in 
Chapter 3. The German Democratic Republic created the GDR Peace Council when 
the country was formed in 1949. This Council was only active until 1952. While the 
state's rhetoric at times included the goal of peace, no specific government-sponsored 
organization attempted to actively pursue the completion of such a large task. The 
emergence of independent peace movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s created 
problems for the East German government. While East German leaders ( at times) 
claimed to want peace, their foreign policy did not always reflect such a goal. This 
was particularly evident during the intermediate nuclear force (INF) controversy, 
which debated the number of intermediate nuclear weapons the United States could 
have in Western Europe and the number that the Soviet Union could have within the 
Eastern Bloc, which lasted from 1979 until 1983. The independent peace movements 
focused on such contradictions in the state's rhetoric. In doing so, these groups 
created active dissent that could not easily be quelled because the government 
supposedly supported all activities that led toward a greater level of peace in the 
world. 
For this reason, the German Democratic Republic revived the GDR Peace 
Council in 1983. From 1983 until 1986, the Council organized and sponsored 
numerous activities to get East German citizens involved in the peace campaign. At 
times, the GDR Peace Council used tactics, such as marches and rallies, which the 
independent peace movements had originally utilized. The state wanted to replace the 
inherent dissent within the independent peace movements by taking over the issue of 
12 
peace as a cause that was strongly advocated by the East German government. While 
numerous German sources verify the tactics taken by the state to accomplish this, 
there are also several English sources that demonstrate that the German Democratic 
Republic wanted to show those in the Western, capitalist world that it was fighting for 
peace. These sources advertise the activities of the East German state's peace 
movement while also pointing out the virtuous activities of the German Democratic 
Republic and the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace. 
These two very different types of peace movements demonstrate the creation 
and quelling of dissent within the German Democratic Republic. Prior to the early 
1980s (with the exception of the 1953 Uprising), the East German state had not been 
actively opposed by such numbers of its own citizens. Their response could not be 
overly harsh because these independent peace groups were usually contained and often 
protected by the Lutheran Church, which had been a largely (but not always respected) 
guaranteed "free space" in East Germany since the mid-1970s. For this reason and the 
political issues, spec'ifically the Soviet Union placing more intermediate range nuclear 
weapons in East Germany in 1981 and 1982, involved in the INF debate, the state 
could not repress the independent peace movements, as they would have done at any 
previous time. Instead the German Democratic Republic had to wait until the INF 
controversy had concluded before it could take up the cause of peace as its own, as 
discussed below in Chapter 4. 
The peace movements from 1979 until 1986 have rarely been discussed in the 
historiography that seeks to explain why the German Democratic Republic collapsed 
in 1989. Since the Berlin Wall fell, the episodes of 1988 and 1989 have been 
13 
thoroughly detailed. While 1989 was a watershed event, there were many prior 
actions that led to the success of 1989. The independent peace movements from 1979 
until 1983 created a grassroots level of dissent for the first time in the state's history. 
These movements also taught organizational and leadership skills to many individuals 
who would use them again in 1989. The activities of the independent peace 
movements provided many of the tools, as well as the realization that opposition was 
possible, that made 1989 such a watershed event for the late twentieth century. 
15 
Chapter 2 
Case Studies of Independent Peace Movements 
In We Were the People: Voices From East Germany 's Revolutionary Autumn 
of 1989, Dirk Philipsen argues against the idea that "the events of 1989 were somehow 
a product of a 'spontaneous' rising."27 While 1989 has received the majority of 
historians' attention in the last decade, the events leading to the German Democratic 
Republic's collapse did not happen overnight. The idea of a spontaneous revolution is 
an interesting theory, but it is incorrect. The following chapter discusses key leaders 
and groups that represent certain categories within the independent peace movements 
of the early 1980s prior to the turning point of 1989. These categories include: a 
pastor's efforts in Berlin (with almost complete access to Western media broadcasts as 
well as contact with Western journalists), a small city group in Halle with Western 
media access that grew to an unanticipated degree, and a women's peace movement in 
Berlin. The case of the women's peace movement is important because it was the first 
women's movement in the German Democratic Republic. These women learned that 
they did not merely have to listen at group meetings but they could express their 
opinions and even become leaders. All three of these case studies are in regions that 
had access to the Western media, yet in each case, the motivations of the individuals 
involved were not solely responses to peace movements in West Germany. Instead, 
their aims were to increase peace, provide more open forums where citizens could 
express their fears, concerns, and opinions, and to reform the state from the inside out. 
21 We Were the People, 16. 
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This information goes against the idea that the East German peace movements were 
only copycat events and not the true sentiments of East German citizens. 
In numerous interviews with leaders of the 1989 dissident movements, 
Philipsen uncovered an important correlation: the majority of these influential 
individuals had participated in, if not in fact led, previous protest groups. One of the 
best known of these interviewees is Rainer Eppelmann, a Lutheran pastor in East 
Berlin during the early 1980s. 
Eppelmann represents the epitome of a particular type of East German activist. 
He was fairly safe from serious harm because of his position in the church in addition 
to his intelligent use of Western media to ensure that he would not just "disappear." 
Eppelmann also preached in East Berlin where knowledge of Western activities, such 
as peace movements, was prevalent because Western German television transmitted 
into East Berlin and much of the GDR. While not a typical Lutheran preacher in any 
other time period (given Lutheran traditional deference to political authority at earlier 
times in German history), Eppelmann does fit the profile of many East German 
preachers who joined the profession because of their radical political tendencies. The 
Lutheran church was not entirely protected from the government's authority or the 
Stasi, but a career as a pastor permitted one to avoid severe penalties for not following 
the Socialist Unity Party's policies. 
Eppelmann's life did not begin as that of a typical East German. He attended a 
school in West Berlin until the 1961 erection of the Berlin Wall. 28 Prior to the 
28 Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographisches Lexi/con (Berlin: Christoph Links, 1992), 103. 
17 
building of the Wall, Eppelmann had not been a pacifist. In fact, he had intended to 
become a fighter pilot in the West German army. Because he had attended West 
German schools, the government refused to let him take the Abitur, the exam 
necessary to attend university.29 Subsequently, Eppelmann worked as a roofer's 
apprentice. Then he was drafted into an East German construction brigade for a very 
brief stint because he refused to take the military oath that included, "'with a weapon 
in my hand. "'30 After eight months in jail for this offense, he served his eighteen 
months required service and then returned to a construction apprenticeship. After 
completion of this apprenticeship, Eppelmann entered a construction-engineering 
program. After only a brief period there, he became a bricklayer because he found the 
East German university too close-minded after his liberal, West German education. 
As for numerous others in his generation, the 1968 Prague Spring was the turning 
point for Eppelmann. He and his sister legibly signed and provided a complete 
address in a solidarity declaration book at the Czechoslovakian Embassy. 3 1  Shortly 
thereafter, in 1969, Eppelmann began classes at an East Berlin seminary.32 While he 
had been confirmed previously in his life and attended services, he had not been 
overly religious. 33 His decision to become a pastor hinged more on political 
convictions than religious beliefs '"because the church was the only place in which 
one could breathe in this country. "'34 He served as the pastor of the Samariter Parish 
29 We Were the People, 58. Interview by Philipsen with Rainer Eppelmann. 
30 We Were the People, 60. 
31 We Were the People, 61 .  
32 Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographisches Lexikon, 103. 
33 We Were the People, 62. 
34 We Were the People, 56. 
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in East Berlin as well as the district youth pastor for East Berlin's Friedrichshain 
borough. 35 It is in these capacities that his dissident tendencies grew. His most novel 
actions were the creation of "Blues Masses" in the late 1970s, writing letters to leaders 
of the German Democratic Republic, and co-authoring a call for a ''peace without 
arms" in 1982 with Robert Havemann. 
Eppelmann turned into an acknowledged revolutionary within the church 
almost immediately. He departed from the traditional use of a biblical theme as the 
focus of youth masses. Instead, Eppelmann decided to ask youths in attendance about 
concerns in their lives. As he remembered, "The topics that came up had to do with 
hopelessness, feeling incarcerated, fear, fear of the police, fear of the Stasi, fear of 
superiors-all these were topics that we tried to pick up on, even during public 
events."36 This form of "outside the box thinking" epitomized Eppelmann's actions as 
a pastor. He was one of the first to provide a public forum for expressing political 
opinions. This was extremely uncommon because "citizens of the GDR only 
expressed what they really thought among circles of close friends, the family, or at the 
neighborhood bar after they got drunk-but never publicly. "37 Eppelmann continually 
pushed the envelope. 
After being asked by a young man to allow blues concerts in the church around 
1980, Eppelmann suggested a few improvements to this idea and in doing so created 
the "Blues Masses."38 Blues were popular throughout East Germany as well as West 
35 Wer war wer - DDR: Ein biographisches Lexi/con, 103. 
36 We Were the People, 63. 
37 We Were the People, 63. 
38 We Were the People, 63-64. 
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Germany because of the infiltration of American music after World War II. The view 
of blues music that was held by the GDR state was that this type of American music 
was something that only those opposed to the government or degenerates would listen 
to. Eppelmann described the "Blues Masses" as starting 
with biblical texts about love, then [the young man] played a few blues songs, 
then we read a few texts, and so on, and 200 people showed up, for heaven's 
sake. For a normal church service in downtown Berlin you would never have 
gotten together 200 people. The next time we chose our own theme, wrote our 
own texts while still using some biblical texts, and then 400 people showed up. 
This kept on growing-growing so much, in fact that people began to come 
from all over the country, with backpacks on their shoulders, lining up in front 
of the church because they were worried they wouldn't be able to get in. 
During peak times-that must have been in the early '80s-10,000 people 
showed up. We had to repeat some services three to five times. 39 
This description explains a lot about the independent peace movements in the German 
Democratic Republic in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some aspects justify detailed 
explanation. These movements were often held in churches where the government 
tolerated a level of "free space" as a safety valve. The utilization of church rooms as 
meeting places did not mean that those attending were necessarily Christian believers. 
This is worth emphasizing. Likewise, Eppelmann' s case also demonstrates that not all 
. East German Lutheran pastors chose the profession solely because of their religious 
convictions. Many actions at this time were driven by political necessity or on an 
even more simplistic level, the need for a free civic space, a place where opinions 
against governmental policies could be voiced. The government's tolerance of the 
Lutheran church, especially after the 1978 agreement, meant that Lutheran churches 
became forums where dissent could be voiced. It will become clear in later examples 
39 We Were the People, 64. 
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that the church did not tolerate every group and certain churches were more strictly 
controlled by the Lutheran church leadership than Eppelmann's. Also, the levels of 
Stasi surveillance and infiltration, not only into groups but also within the church 
hierarchy, varied from city to city. Eppelmann' s "Blues Masses" should be viewed as 
atypical, though the level of support he received from the church hierarchy was not. 
This institutional fact should be kept in mind: behind each parish that allowed 
independent peace groups to meet, there were church leaders who allowed the 
incidents and often protected the participants. In rare cases, church officials were 
unofficial informers for the Stasi, but the majority in the hierarchy were well­
intentioned. 
However, the Stasi did have an impact on Eppelmann's life. The "Blues 
Masses" were highly controversial and for that reason Eppelmann and the participants 
were watched and at times punished. As the "Blues Masses" became larger events, 
the Stasi, local police, and the East Berlin mayor all confronted Eppelmann, ordering 
that he stop holding these services. 40 In spite of these problems, the church hierarchy 
stood behind him though they also told him, "Eppelmann, you're putting the fate of 
the entire church at risk with your activities.',41 He told Philipsen that these events 
were difficult for him, but Eppelmann believed that he nevertheless had to sponsor 
these services. Throughout his story, Eppelmann emphasized the overriding 
importance of a free civic sphere. His actions reinforced this idea. He believed that 
too many citizens were suffering not from a lack of voice (though it was definitely a 
40 We Were the People, 64-65. 
41 We Were the People, 65. 
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problem), but more importantly citizens did not know if they were the only ones who 
were feeling so much fear and were detached from each other as a consequence. 
Eppelmann appears to have truly wanted to help these people. In order to do so, he 
felt that he had to lead them. Eppelmann did this not only by backing the "Blues 
Masses" but also through letters ( some of which were given in advance to the Western 
media) to top government officials asking for change in the German Democratic 
Republic. 
An example of such a letter is one that Rainer Eppelmann wrote to Erich 
Honecker on September 24, 1981. In this letter, Eppelmann requested political 
changes, especially in relation to issues of peace. He began the letter by stating "It is 
five minutes before noon. ,,42 Eppelmann stated that the threat of a nuclear war was as 
high as ever in 1981. He told Honecker that many resources, including human labor 
and East German money, had been irresponsibly used. Eppelmann argued that 
increases in nuclear weapons only led to higher levels of"fear, mistrust, hate, 
aggression, and resignation" between countries. 43 He told Honecker that peace was 
the only solution because it builds trust and confidence between people and nations, 
which is impossible to do when the threat of nuclear destruction looms so close. 
Eppelmann believed that peace was the only solution to confronting the possibility of 
nuclear destruction. He continued to explain to Honecker why he should make 
increasing efforts toward peace with Western countries. 44 
42 Wolfgang Btlscher, Peter Wensierski, and Klaus Wolschner, eds., Friedensbewegung in der DDR: 
Texte 1978-1982 (Hattingen: Scandica, 1982), 178. 
43 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 178-179. 
44 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 178-179. 
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Eppelmann believed that the military was beyond the realm of control by East 
German citizens, even though the civilians would be destroyed if nuclear war 
occurred. Civilian interests were not being taken into account, and citizens wanted 
them to be, especially those who were Christians and pacifists because they were the 
primary leaders of the independent peace movements. Eppelmann wanted Honecker 
to support specific measures that could achieve peace for the numerous East German 
citizens who desired it. Instead of ordering Western European countries to disarm and 
giving NATO rules for disarmament, Eppelmann believed Honecker must first build 
trust between East Germany and Western Europe. He even provided Honecker with 
specific proposals for procedures that would lead to increased trust. 45 
The letter contained sixteen ideas that Eppelmann believed must be followed to 
create peace in Europe. First, he wanted to ban the production, sale, and importation 
of all war toys. Second, Eppelmann believed that soldiers must not be glorified in 
schoolbooks or in homework materials. Third, he wanted "organized visits of the 
kindergarten groups and school classes" to the barracks to end.46 Fourth, Eppelmann 
believed that student and worker military training as well as studying the history of the 
army must be ended. Fifth, he deemed it necessary to teach students methods of 
peaceful conflict resolution in their families and in their work, and he also asserted 
that students needed to learn environmental conservation techniques in addition to 
taking an introduction to psychology class. Eppelmann wanted "financial and 
occupational preferential treatment" ended for youths who decided to make military 
45 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 179. 
46 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 179. 
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service their career.47 He also wanted Honecker to stop discrimination against youths 
who decided not to make the military their career. Eppelmann also believed that 
alternatives to military service, such as a form of community service, should be 
created and given an equal opportunity. Because of his background in the 
construction division of the army, Eppelmann also asked that "the occupational 
discrimination for conscripts allowed to do non-military ( esp. building) work" end. 48 
The other large changes that Eppelmann believed necessary were ending 
discrimination of students devoted to pacifism, East Germany publicly declaring that 
the country is leading the way "for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe," requesting 
that all European countries follow this example, and a public declaration that the 
German Democratic Republic would gradually disarm. 49 Eppelmann stated that these 
measures were necessary because otherwise, he declared, only "five minutes" 
remained before nuclear war would break out and all of Europe would be destroyed. 
Eppelmann concluded that for this reason, East Germany must risk something in order 
to create peace. He even signed the startling letter "yours faithfully, Rainer 
Eppelmann."50 
As this letter demonstrates, Eppelmann did not want to destroy the German 
Democratic Republic completely; he wanted to reform it. As he explained, "What we 
were trying to do was to turn East Germany into something else, into a society that 
would seem attractive to us, that would seem humane to us, a society in which it 
47 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 
48 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 
49 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 
50 Friedensbewegung in der DDR: Texte 1978-1982, 180. 
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would be fun to live, in which one would be able to fulfill oneself."5 1 In this way, 
Eppelmann fits into Inglehart's "value change school" as a "postmaterialist." He did 
not have to worry about the material goods necessary for daily life. For this reason, he 
had more time to focus on the ideas of change that East German citizens had and 
movements that would attempt to get them to that point. In addition to being a 
"postmaterialist," Eppelmann was also someone affected by the "crises of modernity." 
The causes of his dislike for the current society derived from what it had become as 
opposed to what it once was or could be. Eppelmann's life did not completely change 
when he decided to support the Prague Spring participants in 1968, but his ideals did 
begin to come to the forefront of his mind and they demanded action. He could have 
continued to make a good living as a bricklayer, but he would not have been able to 
speak his mind. For Eppelmann, the increasing forced militarization in schools and 
workplaces was something he saw as unnecessary and harmful. While he was not 
initially a pacifist, Eppelmann did view increased state control in all areas of life as 
overbearing. There was no public sphere, not even a true private sphere. Even if the 
German Democratic Republic did not maintain constant surveillance of every single 
person through the Stasi, each person suspected and feared that he or she was being 
watched in such a way. This fear was, not only for Eppelmann but also more 
importantly for those in his congregation, another of his perceived crises of modernity. 
The final crisis was the increased level of Soviet nuclear weapons in East Germany. 
Because Eppelmann was a leader, he did not really fit into the micro-level analysis for 
51 We Were the People, 237. 
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group participation. He encouraged others to join because of his belief in the various 
causes. Each individual who attended the "Blues Masses" and other activities had to 
decide what his or her reasons were, but Eppelmann initiated and perpetuated the 
various causes, demanding confrontation, but not controlling action. 
Other independent peace movements existed, though most did not know of the 
large gatherings in East Berlin in detail. One such movement formed in Halle in 1978 
after a local pastor formed an "open group" calling itself "Open Work." Frank 
Eigenfeld, a biologist by trade as well as a founding member of the largest 
oppositional group in the late 1980s, New Forum, and his wife joined. At "Open 
Work," members discussed various problems in their lives and tried to find possible 
solutions. One area that they continued to return to was the issue of increasing nuclear 
weapons deployed in East Germany. Eigenfeld and his wife were among the few 
older members of "Open Work." The majority of the members were younger, though 
all appear to have worked together to develop plans of action across generational 
lines.52 
"Open Work" wanted to draw attention to the problems of larger numbers of 
nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic. To accomplish this, the group 
decided to conduct small demonstrations. These were largely successful because no 
one in the government expected such actions. Eigenfeld's description of their first 
demonstration seems almost surreal. During an official East German "peace meeting" 
in 1981, the group marched alongside the "blueshirts," the party-operated Free 
52 We Were the People, 39. This is the source for all but the first sentence of this paragraph. Interview 
by Philipsen with Frank Eigenfeld. 
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German Youth (FDJ). Members of "Open Work" continued to march in the "Make 
Peace Against NATO Weapons" state meeting even though they also opposed Soviet 
nuclear missiles that were to be stationed throughout East Germany. "Open Work" 
made it all the way to the grandstand, which contained the district party leaders. At 
that point, the independent group of about eighty people began singing songs to gain 
attention from the leaders and the crowd. They briefly achieved this before being 
drowned out by the "blueshirts" yelling "' long live the party. "'53 This first event was 
successful in gaining attention, even if only briefly, for their cause. Various "forms of 
repression, summonses, and such" limited future success. Eigenfeld pointed out that 
the first event was the only one free of oppressive measures. At the 1981 "Make 
Peace Against NATO Weapons" march, the government merely photographed them. 54 
In spite of the government's efforts to contain the Halle group, they soon 
conducted other demonstrations and activities. This shows that their actions were not 
for limited goals. They desired more than brief governmental attention. The group 
desired real change and social impact. Many have suggested that the dissident 
movements of the 1980s desired the downfall of the government. Even in these 
seemingly extreme cases of opposition, the leaders of these groups did not think in 
terms of the destruction of the German Democratic Republic (this perhaps began to 
occur closer to 1989). Eigenfeld demonstrated this point when he said that in the early 
1980s, his "hopes did not encompass the idea that the existing state had to be 
53 We Were the People, 40. 
54 We Were the People, 39-40. 
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toppled. "55 This idea runs throughout almost every story of East German dissenters. 
More than anything, these individuals desired real change in the existing environment. 
They were tired of the government's hypocrisy and repression. 
While they desired peace, the independent peace movements were also 
effective tools for political dissent. The government had a peace agenda as previously 
noted, "Make Peace Against NATO Weapons" (Frieden Schaffen und gegen NATO­
Waffen). For this reason, the issue of peace was one of the few realms where a small 
level of freedom existed for East German citizens. Clearly this was still quite limited 
as the crackdown on the "Open Work" group revealed. The cause of peace was also 
an area that the Lutheran church supported strongly. This allowed those who desired 
change to use churches as meeting places. Only when groups severely deviated from 
the issue of peace, narrowly construed, did some church leaders intervene and refuse 
to allow meeting space. And this was often only because of increased governmental 
controls against various churches. Prior to such suppressio� groups in Halle and other 
cities worked to change not only policies and actions with respect to nuclear weapons 
but also to change the East German system to allow more freedom for its citizens. 
According to Eigenfeld, ''Open Work" was not an overly theoretical organization. 
Members felt that "the party pretty much determined people's lives, that nobody had 
the opportunity to participate freely in this society, that 'they' always decided 
everything."56 The group wanted to change the German Democratic Republic from a 
55 We Were the People, 40. 
56 We Were the People, 45. 
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repressively controlled government to one that tolerated expression of opinions against 
certain policies. 
They tried to do this through several methods, specifically targeting the causes 
of peace and the environment, topics that had received a fair amount of support from 
the Lutheran church in the mid-l 970s (in the two Germanies ). An example of the 
level of suppression that Eigenfeld and the others had to endure is exemplified by one 
particular environmental demonstration incident ( though similar ones occurred with 
peace protests). As Eigenfeld explained to Philipsen, "each and every time, [these] 
resulted in our short-term arrest, such as an environmental demonstration in which we 
wanted to bike to Buna ( an extremely polluted industrial center near Halle), with 
banners, signs, and petitions, and so on. "57 
In addition to these arrests in 1982 and 1983, Eigenfeld and three others 
attempted to draft a "petition about the current situation in the GDR," but he and 
another member were briefly arrested though not tried for any crime. 58 Their defense 
attorney was Wolfgang Schnur, who often defended dissidents though he was also-­
unknown to his clients-an important Stasi informer. Schnur typically advised his 
clients and their families not to go to the Western media. He initially convinced 
Eigenfeld of this when Eigenfeld's wife was arrested on August 3 1, 1983, for helping 
plan a failed peace demonstration. Two weeks later, Erich Honecker released 
57 We Were the People, 45. This is only the source for the last sentence of this paragraph. 
58 We Were the People, 45. 
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Sebastian Pflugbeil, an East Berlin dissident, after the mayor of West Berlin argued 
publicly for his release. 59 Clearly, publicity was effective at times. 
This event was a turning point for Eigenfeld. Previously, he had believed that 
involving the Western media would be pointless, but this event proved that publicity 
was key in protection from long-term imprisonment. Prior to 1983, "Open Work" did 
not network with other peace movements. "Open Work" had heard about Eppelmann 
and members attended his church in Berlin around 1980. They also tried to establish 
initial contacts with him though they were not really successful in doing so in a 
significant way until 1982. The members of "Open Work" likely traveled to attend a 
"Blues Mass" as so many others throughout East Germany had done. Eigenfeld used 
his wife's role in creating a local "Women for Peace" group in Halle to enlist the 
support of the much larger, founding Berlin group of"Women for Peace." Eigenfeld 
explained that by 1983 "everyone had vague notions about other groups, but until then 
we had not attempted to establish any contacts. "60 The emergency situation and 
understanding of the importance of publicity led him to drive to Berlin to find help by 
searching for Western contacts. Eigenfeld' s use of the Western media resulted in 
intervention by the West German Green party who petitioned Honecker for his wife's 
release, which occurred the following day. 61 
From this point on Eigenfeld decided, in a fundamental shift, that the Halle 
group "should try [to] use the Western media as a source of security."62 Eigenfeld 
59 We Were the People, 45-46. 
60 We Were the People, 46. 
61 We Were the People, 43-4, 46, 5 1 .  
62 We Were the People, 52. 
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finally understood that if activists "continued to work in isolation and engage in 
actions without letting the Western media know about it, no one would find out about 
them. ,,6J Previously, Eigenfeld and others in the Halle peace movement believed that 
they should not tum to the Western media because the issues were internal East 
German matters. This demonstrates that the Halle movement continued to believe in 
reform from within. They sent petitions to state and party officials and not to the 
Western media because they "nurtured the naive hope that some day [they] would 
receive a position response through official avenues. "64 It took the arrest of 
Eigenfeld's wife to force him to realize how ineffective their actions had previously 
been. The Halle peace group had held numerous marches and events in the center of 
the city, but very few people knew about them and those who did refused to spread the 
word. Eigenfeld believes this was because of the Stasi's control and people's fear of 
being labeled as dissidents. In this way, the Stasi maintained boundaries for topics of 
discussion in East German society. However, information gained through the Western 
media was outside of this realm of Stasi control. Since the government tacitly 
tolerated East German citizens watching Western television programs, knowledge 
gained through such channels could be discussed with others. This realization in 
addition to the need for security against almost certain arrests and indefinite 
imprisonment led the Halle peace movement to add the use of Western media to their 
63 We Were the People, 52. 
64 We Were the People, 50. 
operations. They achieved this by twice monthly trips to Berlin to update the media 
about their activities. 65 
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For Eigenfeld, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was his crisis. He 
explained, "All of a sudden it became strikingly clear to me that there are certain 
people out there who have the power fundamentally to curtail your wishes and your 
plans. This was something I wasn't used to from home, and something I was never 
able to accept. "66 He viewed constraints as unjust, though he says he and others he 
knew felt powerless, especially after the failure of the Prague Spring. Eigenfeld's 
turning point came after the 1977-1978 nuclear annaments buildups in East and West 
Germany. During this period, he decided that he could no longer watch what 
happened but that he should take action and stop being a victim. 67 
This transformation demonstrates that Eigenfeld had time to think and worry 
about non-material values, which means that he was a "postmaterialist" in terms of 
lnglehart' s theories. Eigenfeld fits Habermas' model almost perfectly because he 
believed that the environment's destruction and increases in nuclear weapons were 
killing the German Democratic Republic. Habermas' model states that those who 
believe social movements are created because of a crisis of modernity often use the 
example of nuclear weapons and pollution as threatening "the physical foundations of 
life, while destruction of traditional social settings undermined sources of meaning. "68 
This is exactly what Eigenfeld believed. The only area that does not completely 
65 We Were the People, 50, 52. 
66 We Were the People, 37. 
61 We Were the People, 38. 
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accord with Habermas' model is the idea of advanced capitalism. While East 
Germany was explicitly created with an anti-capitalist system, there was still a crisis 
of modernity for Eigenfeld. The state continually infringed on his life and undermined 
what he valued, specifically the environment and peace. For these reasons, Eigenfeld 
decided that he must participate in social movements against the state. On the micro­
level, Eigenfeld not only believed in the ideas of the independent peace movement in 
Halle but he also felt that it was necessary for East Germans to be able to voice their 
opinions even when they opposed governmental actions. Eigenfeld' s participation 
ultimately hinged on his desire to end the German Democratic Republic's repression 
of its own citizens. 
The experience of Vera Wollenberger has certain important similarities to that 
of Eppelmann and Eigenfeld as well as many striking differences. Just as in the cases 
of the two men, Wollenberger' s participation in the independent peace movement 
began in a church. Like them she eventually came to believe that open, genuine 
discussions needed to occur in which all citizens could freely voice their opinions. 
W ollenberger also believed that the German Democratic Republic should continue to 
exist but that it had to adapt in order to do so. While her views were comparable to 
those of Eppelmann and Eigenfeld in these areas, her case differed considerably in 
terms of her personal life. Unknown to her prior to East Germany's collapse, her 
husband, Knud ("Donald" to the state), was a Stasi informer. Additionally, her case is 
significant because Wollenberger provides a female perspective as well as that of a 
mother in a peace group. 
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Wollenberger' s participation in the independent peace movement was a 
gradual process ( unlike her husband's unhesitating decision to be a Stasi informer). 69 
She studied historical materialism at the Academy of Science under Professor 
Wolfgang Eichhom.70 Around 1975 she formed a small house circle that met to 
discuss science fiction authors Karl-Heinz and Angela Steinmiiller.71 This group 
eventually progressed to examine other issues, and began to work through the history 
of modem European philosophy. 72 While Wollenberger did not view their weekly 
meetings as practical, she argues that the intellectual exchange the group fostered was 
very important to her.73 This appears to be one of the activities that led Wollenberger 
to believe that discussion was necessary in any country. Her house group's meetings 
were not direct dissent but they were also not typical. 
Beyond this group, Wollenberger, like many others her age, had prior 
knowledge of important dissident events in the Eastern Bloc. She had been present 
when classmates at her school discussed the Prague Spring of 1968. 74 Wollenberger 
also knew about a group of students that experienced disciplinary action and party 
punishment when its activities in 1971 were deemed by the government to be anti­
Soviet and attempting to undermine the strength of the military. 75 She knew the 
consequences for such actions, yet she still had great illusions and hopes that change 
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could occur. 76 These hopes gradually faded the longer she worked at the Academy of 
Science.77 
Wollenberger' s participation in the independent peace movement seems almost 
accidental, though her husband's secret work likely unintentionally led to this activity. 
It all began when she and her husband attended an event at the old parish in Berlin­
Pankow on October 24, 1981.78 The new youth pastor, Ruth Misselwitz, began a 
discussion of the theme "Against Death-Security for Peace."79 At the end of the 
service, a leaflet came around that explained the creation of a peace circle that those 
attending could attend. 80 Wollenberger writes that she and Knud entered their names, 
and they later received an invitation from Ruth Misselwitz with details for the first 
meeting.81  A month later, fifty people gathered in the parish hall on Hadlichstrasse in 
the Pankow district. 82 Wollenberger became very anxious when she had to introduce 
herself to the group though she remembers that Knud was oddly calm. 83 It was at this 
first meeting where she began to work in an independent peace movement. 
After her first month of participation in the group, the peace circle rapidly 
became the center of their lives for the next year. For the first time, Wollenberger was 
able to overcome her shyness and voice her own opinions to the Pankow peace circle. 
In this environment, she was able to freely express her ideas in front of a relatively 
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large group, an experience she had never previously had. Wollenberger describes it as 
a new intellectual freedom because she could express her views instead of hiding them 
as she had done growing up and as an adult. These were not necessarily new thoughts, 
but now her ideas developed and evolved for the first time because of the input of the 
group.84 
After Wollenberger began to participate in the group, she also assumed a role 
as one of the teachers. She and her students often had politically critical discussions in 
which she taught them to be mindful of the numerous pro-Marxist mottos that existed. 
Only later did Wollenberger participate in critical discussion classes in her work at the 
Academy of Science. Wollenberger describes her experience in the Pankow peace 
circle as separate from her career. In the circle, she could discuss her opinions while 
in her work, she was forced to ignore them. Eventually the Pankow peace circle grew 
to include more members of the public, which also increased the risk that sooner or 
later repressive measures from the state would descend on them all. Wollenberger 
effectively describes the possible actions against an individual determined to be a 
dissident. The initial measures would be discrimination in the workplace. This could 
then escalate into loss of job, and even more severe were travel restrictions, detention, 
and possibly (as a last resort) forced deportation out of the German Democratic 
Republic. 85 
The creation of the Pankow peace circle thus came with many risks, though the 
greatest of these was not ever knowing if a member was a Stasi informer who could 
84 Virus der Beuchler, 17-1 8. 
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turn the whole group into criminals by reporting to East German authorities. 86 While 
church rooms were supposed to have a legally safe status, the meetings the Pankow 
peace circle held in the parish were not purely Christian meetings. 87 In spite of this 
risk, Wollenberger decided to participate iµ the circle. She even commented that after 
the first meeting without any incidents, the fear of being reported disappears. 88 While 
in retrospect this may appear incredibly naive, it would be almost impossible to live 
any kind of life while constantly fearing that the Stasi was going to arrest you. Instead 
of focusing on such concerns, Wollenberger and the peace circle grew so much that 
she even created a private philosophy circle that studied the environment and later one 
that focused exclusively on ecology. 89 One perceives here the dynamics of growing 
personal and group activity. 
For almost all of 1982, the Pankow peace circle worked without being 
disturbed. During this time, the "Core Members" developed into fast friends. As 
Wollenberger describes the members, most were in their thirties with small children. 
For this reason, children played an important role in their group. While they worked 
and discussed, their children stayed busy. At one point, the children even took part in 
role-playing peaceful actions. In Wollenberger' s min� the amount of participation 
that their children were allowed made it possible for the adults to discuss and theorize 
as well as play, sing, and dance. In this way, the experience was very different from 
86 Virus der Beuchler, 19. 
81 Virus der Beuchler, 19. 
88 Virus der Beuchler, 19. 
89Virus der Beuchler, 19-20. 
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the "fossilized system" of East Germany. The peace circle provided a new way of 
living, an alternative model.90 
Because of these reasons, Wollenberger fits into Inglehart's model as a 
postmaterialist because she was able to look beyond the issue of security. She realized 
the danger that could come with Stasi intervention because of her participation in the 
Pankow peace circle, yet she chose to ignore this. In fact, Wollenberger fits the 
postmodernist category almost exactly because her desire for intellectual discourse 
was so gratifying that it outweighed the associated threat of harassment or detention 
by the state. 
Wollenberger also fits the theories of Habermas, though only gradually. 
Through her participation in the peace circles, she realized what the German 
Democratic Republic was missing. While in Habermas' model, those joining social 
movements do so with the knowledge and intent of reacting against the failures of the 
current system to adapt, it took participation with others before Wollenberger realized 
how problem-ridden the state had become. After this realization, she worked to solve 
this crisis, which she believed could be accomplished through public discussion that 
would lead to changes not only in the government but also in society at large. 
On the micro-level, Wollenberger enjoyed participating in the Pankow peace 
circle because of the group's unity and camaraderie. Her desire for group success as 
well as intellectual fulfillment trumped her fears about reactive measures taken by the 
90 
Virus der Beuchler, 20. 
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state. For Wollenberger the cost-benefit analysis always came down on the side of 
participation in spite of the risks. 
This was also true for Eppelmann and Eigenfeld. All three believed in 
reforming the German Democratic Republic, and they felt that this could be done 
through the work of the independent peace movements. Most importantly, they 
valued the ideal that citizens should have a voice in the state, especially if the 
government acted in unjust ways. The independent peace movements provided them 
as well as many other citizens with such a voice. 
Chapter 3 
Superseding the Independent Peace Movements: the Case of the German 
Democratic Republic Peace Council 
39 
According to literature written and published by the German Democratic Peace 
Council, East Germany was always committed to the cause of peace because of the 
lessons learned from World War I and World War II. 91 These statements clearly fit 
the mission of the GDR Peace Council in the late 1980s but do not seem completely 
accurate because the actions of the East German government did not always adhere to 
increasing peace. This is particularly evident in the euromissile debate that occurred 
from 1979-1983 . 
Literature written by the GDR Peace Council demonstrates the contradictions 
that exist between the rhetoric and the reality of the state's actions. The English 
translation of the GDR Peace Council's work, The peace movement in the GDR, and 
its distribution to libraries in the United States prior to the collapse of East Germany 
also indicates a specifically, carefully targeted audience.92 Throughout the Council's 
pronouncements, claims are made that all areas of society are welcome and participate 
in the GDR Peace Council's activities.93 One of the most blatant of these assertions 
comes on the first page after the introductory comments. It states, "By nature, the 
peace movement of the GDR is a democratic mass movement which comprises all 
classes and strata of society, people of all ages, different philosophies and religious 
91 Intertext Berlin, translate� The peace movement in the GDR (Berlin: Zeit im Bil� 1986), 5. 
92 Imprint of University of Wisconsin Library with the date clearly marked as October 17, 1985 in 
World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR: No Militarisation of Space! Stop the Arms Race! (Dresden: 
Grafischer Grossbetrieb V0lkerfreundschaft, 1985), 1 .  
93 The peace movement in the GDR, 5. 
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beliefs. "94 If the movement was truly democratic, then why were all of the 
independent peace movements discussed in the previous chapter excluded and 
persecuted? It also is highly irregular for a text to mention its broad-based support yet 
provide no individual examples of this throughout the entire work. Each quoted 
endorsement comes from a leading member of the Politburo, (primarily Erich 
Honecker, leader of East Germany and a senior member of the GDR Peace Council) or 
writers who strongly supported the German Democratic Republic. Where were those 
members with "different philosophies and religious beliefs?"95 They could possibly 
be among the faceless crowds pictured at the government sponsored peace concerts 
and peace rallies. But this is unlikely since most who participated were involved in 
the official Free German Youth or were party members who were expected to 
participate ( as discussed in the Halle example). 
Why publish such a work in English unless the East German government was 
in fact trying to foster a new agenda and possibly cover up abuses against truly 
independent peace movement leaders in the early 1980s? The peace movement in the 
GDR has a very propagandistic feel. The historical tradition and activities of the GDR 
Peace Council are spelled out in terms that a middle school student could understand. 
The work states that five months before the creation of the German Democratic 
Republic, ''the 'German Committee of Fighters for Peace' was founded in Berlin to 
later become the Peace Council of the GDR."96 If this is the case, then where was this 
94 The peace movement in the GDR, 5. 
95 The peace movement in the GDR, 5. 
96 The peace movement in the GDR, 6. 
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Peace Council during the late 1970s, the early 1980s, and before, when Soviet nuclear 
weapons were stationed in East Germany? The GDR Peace Council likely existed 
only nominally since there is no continuous evidence of its work prior to the early 
1980s. The Council was apparently active from 1949-1952 since the majority of 
pictures and excerpts come from this period, but the rest with two minor exceptions 
come from 1983 and later. The authors of the work even appear to have noticed the 
gap because they included one sentence to try to demonstrate that the Council 
continuously fought for peace. Supposedly, "Large campaigns were launched by the 
GDR peace movement in the 1960s and 1970s calling for an end to the US 
intervention in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and advocating a European security 
system which was provided with an important contractual basis through the signing of 
the Helsinki Final Act in 1 975."97 This statement comes on the last three pages of the 
work. Even the chronology provided at the back was extremely sparse from 195 1  
until 1 98 1 .98 If the Peace Council was so active, where is the evidence? There are no 
pictures or documents for almost thirty years, yet there were plenty of photos and 
excerpts from 1949-1952 and the early 1980s. The claims regarding the GDR Peace 
Council as a continuous and active presence are very questionable at best. It appears 
much more probable that the Peace Council was not needed by the government until 
independent peace movements threatened the tight control of the German Democratic 
Republic over its citizens. Increased Western media attention apparently made it 
necessary for the government not only to revitalize and revamp its dormant Peace 
91 The peace movement in the GDR, 41-42. 
98 The peace movement in the GDR, 44-48. 
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Council but also to write and translate propaganda for the West that demonstrated a 
high level of commitment to peace throughout its history. 
The evolution of the GDR peace movement's tactics, however, did not take 
place overnight. Originally, many tactics from the independent peace movements 
were used or indeed coopted. Such measures included writing letters to the Erich 
Honecker ( as Rainer Eppelmann and many others had done over the last few years). 
However, one major difference in the letters from the GDR peace movement was that 
they were often written by high-ranking political figures, who were in practice 
Honecker's hierarchical inferiors. One example is the letter to Honecker, which the 
GDR Peace Council composed at one of its meetings.99 Writing to Honecker gave the 
appearance of requesting change while actually only informing him of the measures 
being taken by the Peace Council. Such actions appear to merely be propagandistic 
tools since the information had probably already been discussed and approved by 
Honecker prior to the GDR Peace Council meeting. In spite of this fact, the 
independent peace movements had established the tactic of writing letters to top 
officials appealing for transformations in the current system. By following such 
methods, the German Democratic Republic could gradually absorb the cause of peace 
and slowly muffle the independent peace moveiµents by taking over some of their 
characteristic methods. 
While writing public letters to leading East German officials was one step in 
the process of superseding the independent peace movements, several other devices 
99 Entering the third millennium without nuclear weapons (Dresden: Grafischer Grossbetrieb 
VOlkerfreundschaft, 1986), 4-6. 
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were also used. A few of these included signatures on resolutions requesting 
disarmament, small meetings, and large rallies. 100 Gaining the support of certain 
members of the East German Lutheran churches was another important tool. This was 
still a difficult and not entirely successful task for the state. The primary obstacle in 
this endeavor was the level of independence that each parish pastor had. While the 
pastor should follow certain guidelines, each parish differed in the level of 
participation in the independent peace movements. As discussed in the earlier case 
study of Rainer Eppelmann, each parish pastor had to either have the support of the 
hierarchy or take the risk of losing his parish ifhe overstepped the hierarchy's wishes. 
For these and other personal reasons, many parish pastors chose not to participate in 
the independent peace movements. Yet those pastors who were involved managed to 
tolerate, and at times even foster, enough dissent that the state viewed them as a threat. 
This led to additional force exerted not only against the dissident pastors and peace 
supporters but also pressure on the higher levels of the hierarchy. It became very 
important to the East German government to control as much of the Lutheran church's 
top hierarchy as possible because the state believed that this would calm dissent. 
By 1982, individual arrests had largely failed because of Western media 
attention. 101 It had become too costly for well-known dissidents to be arrested by an 
East German government that needed to maintain the levels of international support it 
had. Clearly, even the Stasi was aware of this concern and took it into account. In one 
100 Entering the third millennium without nuclear weapons, 43 ; World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR , 28, 
45; Friedensrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Repub� The struggle for peace, more vital than ever 
(Berlin: The Council, 1984), 43. 
101 John Sanford, The Sword and the Ploughshare: Autonomous Peace Initiatives in East Germany 
(London: Merlin Press, 1983), 64. 
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example in 1982, the Stasi arrested Eppelmann and about seventy of his supporters, all 
of whom had signed the Berlin Appeal, which examined numerous concerns of the 
independent peace movements in East Germany. 102 In less than a day, all had been 
released. 103 This cooperation between the state and the Stasi seems to verify the idea 
that the two organizations worked closely together even if many East German citizens 
continued to believe that the Stasi followed a largely separate agenda Given the 
amount of state pressure upon them, many members of the Lutheran hierarchy 
acquiesced to the government's demands though they often did so with an initial 
statement of criticism prior to their support of government proposals. 104 
The German Democratic Republic's Politburo used its new Lutheran 
supporters to argue that the government had always and would continue to assist the 
cause of peace through the one and only official peace movement in East Germany. 
An example of this is the GDR Peace Council's own description of the cooperative 
work it undertook with pastors in the Federation of Evangelical Pastors of the GDR, 
founded in 1958 to "mobilize pro-regime, 'progressive' pastors and pressure the 
church leadership." 105 The members of the Peace Council and the pastors had ''regular 
exchanges of views and ideas in a climate of trust on increased efforts in the campaign 
for peace, detente and disarmament. "106 According to the Peace Council, specific 
cooperative activities included "the opening of the exhibition entitled 'Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki: Warning and Obligation' on World Peace Day 1983 in Magdeburg" as well 
102 The Sword and the Ploughshare, 63-64. 
103 The Sword and the Ploughshare, 64. 
104 The Sword and the Ploughshare, 65. 
105 The Lutheran Church and the East German State, 3 7. 
106 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, 21 .  
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as ''the candid discussion held in November 1 983 in the parish of Berlin-
Oberspree."107 The Hiroshima and Nagasaki exhibition was described by the East 
German Peace Council, not by individual pastors. If there was so much collaboration 
between the state and the pastors ( as the text The struggle for peace, more vital than 
ever claims) then why are more combined activities not listed? In the English 
publications of the GDR examined for this paper, only three specific events are 
discussed with reference to a combined effort by the state and a Protestant church. 
East German publications stated that, "Theologians and members of all religious 
communities which are active in the GDR contribute to the work of the [GDR Peace] 
Council guided by their humanist and Christian beliefs."108 Oddly, in the numerous 
listings of remarks made by East German citizens in GDR Peace Council publications, 
only a few Protestant pastors were quoted. One example was a pastor from Oderberg 
who said, "Every true Christian must raise his voice against President Reagan's attack 
missiles in Western Europe!"109 Another example came from a self-professed member 
of the largely artificial Christian Democrat Party in East Germany and a Protestant 
Synod member who said, "Christians and non-Christians bear an equal measure of 
responsibility" in relation to bringing about peace. 1 10 Both statements were clearly 
political and very supportive of the German Democratic Republic's state. They 
attempted to persuade the reader that these two Christians were representative of all 
East German Christians in terms of their support of the state. The numerous 
107 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, 21 -22. 
108 The peace movement in the GDR, 10, 12. 
109 World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR: The Threat of War Can Be Banned! Peace Must Triumph! 
(Dresden: Grafischer Grossbetrieb VOlkerfreundschaft, 1983), 34. 
1 10 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, 36-37. 
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independent peace movements that were aided by pastors as well as the need to 
threaten many in the Lutheran church hierarchy into submission did not accord with 
the perceived love of the German Democratic Republic's government. The 
participation of Protestant leaders in the official East German peace movement 
appears to have been sporadic at best. 
In spite of this, the rhetoric in the works by the GDR Peace Council 
continually tried to argue that Christians really were very active in the sole East 
German peace movement. In a section entitled "In concert with Christian citizens" the 
case for Christian and state cooperation is made. The Christians and the Lutheran 
churches of East Germany were also said to be increasingly active in the 
cause of peace and disarmament. The Federation of Protestant Churches has 
vowed to live up to _its responsibility for peace with the means and possibilities 
at its command. It has declared its willingness to contribute to the efforts of 
our state towards a more just and peaceful world. Conscious of their shared 
responsibility, many Christians, pastors and theologians have taken part in 
numerous activities undertaken by the all-embracing peace movement of our 
country. 1 1 1  
The dismissal of the independent peace movements is clear with the statement of "the 
all-embracing peace movement." The state refused to acknowledge dissent of any 
kind even though many of those involved in the independent movements often began 
by merely wanting an area where ideas of all types (political, economic, cultural, and 
so forth) could be discussed. Instead of trying to respond to its citizens' desires, the 
East German government wanted to hide all mention of this issue by reclaiming the 
cause of peace and trying to make it exclusively the state's cause. The Peace 
1 1 1  
The struggle for peace, more vital than evert 21-22. 
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Council's writings supported the state's plan by asserting that "The peace movement 
of our country and the policies of our state draw on people from all classes and 
strata." 1 12 
In order to ensure that all levels of society were active in the peace movement, 
the state sponsored numerous activities in the name of peace. Examples included 
members of the Free German Youth (FDJ) pledging their commitment to peace at the 
National Youth Festival held in 1983. 1 13 Other activities for youths, aptly named ''the 
FDJ Mobilization for Peace campaign," were also very influential during the 1984 
celebration of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the German Democratic 
Republic. 1 14 The FDJ demonstrated how they actively worked for peace through their 
labors as industrial workers, students, scientists, and artists. 1 15 The idea of working 
for peace through typical occupations is often presented in the English publications of 
the GDR Peace Council. Underlying this notion is the belief that the government 
supports peace, so if an East German citizen wants to work for peace, he or she can 
increase their level of production at work. B�cause his or her products strengthen the 
state economically, each individual worker can contribute to peace. Theoretically this 
idea is possible, and the East German state could have really believed its own rhetoric. 
More probable, however, is the acknowledgment that the issue of peace could be 
harnessed not merely to quell internal dissent or to gain favorable international 
attention but also to help save the weak economy of the German Democratic Republic. 
1 12 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, 21-22. 
1 13 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, photo caption between 32-33. 
1 14 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, 43. 
1 15 The struggle for peace, more vital than ever, 13 .  
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Eastern Bloc countries were always looking for tools to increase worker production. 
The inherent problem in an economy where everyone who wants work has it, is that 
there are no incentives. Why exert one's energies if job security is a guarantee? Why 
work harder if there are no substantial pay increases? Since East Germany did not 
have abundant wealth, incentives often came in the forms of being able to shop at 
limited access stores as well as ideological attempts to increase worker production by 
appealing to a particular cause. 
An example of this theory in action is �e Open-Cast Mine worker, Martina 
Pfefferkorn, who along with fellow workers tried to follow the '"Good Work for a 
Good World"' motto. 1 16 Pfefferkorn explained this motto as necessary because ''the 
socialist GDR is our country. We have grown up here, gone to school here, many of 
us already have families, we have received new flats and we experience daily the 
social achievements of real socialism."1 17 This statement did not directly correspond 
to the cause of peace, especially in relation to the themes of ending the arms race on 
earth and possibly in space. Instead, Pfefferkorn appeared to be following the socialist 
party line by stating how good conditions were and that the German Democratic 
Republic was her home. Given the context of increased emigration permission in 
1984 and continued requests to leave East Germany by many of its citizens, 
Pfefferkom's statement appeared to target that problem more than the issue of 
peace. 1 1 8 She focused on what the German Democratic Republic had done for her and 
1 16 World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 13. 
1 17 World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 13. 
1 18  See footnote I for specific numbers of emigrants from 1983-1986. 
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how it was where she chose to live (even though it is unknown if she would have 
chosen to stay if she actually had had the opportunity to freely choose). As discussed 
theoretically earlier, the East German Peace Council alleged that "workers are guided 
by the knowledge that the economic stability and productivity of the GDR lends 
international weight to its constructive peace policies."1 19 Even with Pfefferkorn's 
statements, this notion continues to appear as a weak attempt for motivating workers 
to increase their productivity. While such motivations occurred as early as 1 984, few 
questioned that using peace as an incentive could be a sign of economic crisis in the 
country. 
In addition to changes in certain workers' behavior, the German Democratic 
Republic created various new events when the state chose to renew its professed 
interest in peace. GDR peace movement activities ran the gamut from ''meetings, 
discussions, work team gatherings, demonstrations and rallies to public readings, 
poster exhibitions, solidarity b87.8al'S and discussions with scientists and cultural 
workers, peace services, sporting events and rock concerts." 120 While the state did use 
certain ideas from the independent peace movements, the Berlin Peace Run was an 
event invented solely by the East German government: "The biggest running event so 
far was this year's Berlin Peace Run which took place on the eve of World Peace Day 
with 35,000 people taking part." 121 In one source the 1 983 Berlin Peace Run was 
listed as the second time the event had been held, though the amount of German and 
1 19 World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 12. 
120 Entering the third millennium without nuclear weapons, 15, 28. 
121 World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR, 19. 
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English literature on the German Democratic Republic's support of peace was not 
widespread until 1983. 122 
While the Berlin Peace Run was an original idea, the idea of rock concerts was 
likely borrowed from the independent peace movements, possibly coming from the 
successful Blues Masses held at Rainer Eppelmann' s church. Each year (beginning in 
1983) the FDJ sponsored the "Political Song Festival" in which participants focused 
on peace and friendship. 123 Also, the East German government funded "Rock for 
Peace" concerts where the "most popular rock singers and pop groups" performed and 
"donate[d] the proceeds to the peace and solidarity fund."124 Other state ... approved 
activities included "Artists, actors, singers, writers and poets organiz[ing] exhibitions, 
matinees, readings and performances to contribute, along with their artistic talents, to 
the peace struggle and to mobilize people for action." 125 The independent peace 
movements originally dominated similar activities, but by 1983 the German 
Democratic Republic began to make very strong attempts to supersede such activities. 
In many areas the state was largely successful for several reasons. First, the GDR 
Peace Council could actively advertise its meetings, rallies, and similar activities in 
ways the independent movements could not. Second, the state chose to mobilize all 
citizens under its control to compulsory participation in the East German peace 
movement. This meant that all party members, workers in government organizations, 
122 World Peace Day 1983 in the GDR, p.20. 
123 The peace movement in the GDR, 33; Entering the third millennium without nuclear weapons, 30; 
The struggle/or peace, more vital than ever, 43 . 
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and youths in the Free German Youth could be quickly coerced into involvement in 
the cause of peace. Clearly, their level of conviction was a separate issue. 
The ability and willingness of the East German government to draw upon 
members of state-sponsored organizations clearly contributed to the rapid supplanting 
of the independent peace movements by the GDR Peace Council. The East German 
organizations that supported the GDR Peace Cmmcil's activities included "the 
Confederation of Free German Trade Unions as the biggest mass organization of the 
working people, the Free German Youth organization, the Women's Democratic 
League, the Sports and Gymnastics Union, the League of Culture of the GDR and 
numerous professional and other associations."126 These organizations were the most 
important factor in the state's ability to quickly mobilize large masses for rallies, 
meetings, as well as finding citizens who would verbally defend the government's 
stance. According to East German sources, the Free German Youth contained "more 
than 2.3 million members."127 Turning out even a tenth of those members would 
create a huge rally. The independent peace movements could not even remotely 
compete with such numbers because of their lack of a central organization in addition 
to their inability to spread the word about meetings and rallies because their actions 
were hindered by the Stasi. While the GDR Peace Council highlighted large turnouts 
for rallies, such as 300,000 at one rally, their statements were at times clearly 
exaggerated. 128 One example of this embellishment was their statement that "Almost 
126 The peace movement in the GDR, 10. 
127 The peace movement in the GDR, 31. 
128 World Peace Day 1985 in the GDR, 45. 
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every citizen of the GDR participates, in one way or another, in the pluriform 
activities of the GDR's peace movement." 129 While the state did control a number of 
people, it did not have total power over them. If it had, the rally of 300,000 would 
have instead been a million or more people. This type of overstatement reinforces the 
idea that the English-translated GDR Peace Council's texts were tools that the 
government used to try to bolster its own image of East Germany. 
In spite of such embellishments, the East German Peace Council at times 
seemed to realize that it did not control everyone. This understanding was made clear 
in a statement: 
The GDR Peace Council is not a rigid body with a strict organization. It offers 
ample opportunities to everybody who wishes to cooperate constructively with 
the Council in the cause of peace. Therefore, there are no 'membership 
quotas' fixed for certain population groups and there is not even any formal 
membership required for participation in th� struggle against nuclear war and 
the arms race. In this way, the Peace Council and in general the peace 
movement provide vast opportunities and scope to all members of society, 
irrespective of their social, political and philosophical stance, to work for their 
one common goal. 130 
These apparent contradictions that exist only sixteen pages apart could have occurred 
for many reasons. Multiple authors may not have examined previous texts. Or one 
author or one group of authors could have written both statements. While one or two 
authors writing a text with clear contradictions may seem impossible, almost every 
East German citizen thought in terms of several layers of facts and opinions. An 
example of this is that only those people who actually participated in official peace 
movement activities would know for certain of their participation. Yet even those 
129 The peace movement in the GDR, 3 1 .  
130 The peace movement in the GDR, 13 .  
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who did not attend the officially sponsored events would likely say, if questioned by 
his employer, members of the government, or identified Stasi agents, that he attended. 
Even if the state knew the non-attender was lying, they would probably still include 
him in the numbers of attendees because he said that he was there. These 
contradictions aside, the German Democratic Republic did actively decide to work 
toward its own understanding of "peace" with renewed interest from 1983 until 1986. 
This desire is succinctly stated in a work about the 1 983 World Peace Day: "Peace is 
the supreme imperative for us, for the policies of our Party and government. 
Socialism decrees this by its very nature. It has already been said here that another 
war must never emanate from German soil. That has always been our pledge, ever 
since the GDR was founded, and we shall stand by it, now and for all time."13 1  As the 
next chapter explains, East Germany's leaders may not have always practiced such 
peaceful ideas with their actions, but the emphasis on "now" appears to demonstrate 
the state's new effort in this area even if it took independent peace movements to spur 
the government into action. 




The Roller Coaster That was Detente: Ostpolitik and the Early 1980s Arms Race 
The year 1983 was a turning point for the antinuclear peace movements in East 
Germany. There were several reasons for this. Throughout 1983 the German 
Democratic Republic's state worked to gain control over the independent peace 
movements throughout the country. The GDR Peace Council was largely successful 
in its efforts, though the timing of key decisions in the politics surrounding the nuclear 
question also played a role in the Council's accomplishments. By 1984 the 
antinuclear movement had become in effect a non-issue. This was because the 
euromissiles debate, which had specific implications for the two Germanies, ended 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in November 1983 when the United States 
deployed Pershing II missiles in West Germany. However, the GDR Peace Council 
continued to use the issue to ensure that independent peace movements did not 
reemerge. The GDR Peace Council also tried to find common ground and lessen 
tensions between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany because the 
GDR was allied with the Soviet Union but the Federal Republic was one of it main 
trading partners. East German leaders wanted a new type of detente because West 
Germany provided economic benefits that the German Democratic Republic 
desperately needed at this time. Additionally, the Soviet Union was East Germany's 
diplomatic and ideological ally. Relations between the two German states had reached 
a form of rapprochement under the previous West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt. 
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His foreign policy in 1972 toward the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet 
Union was known as Ostpolitik. 
Brandt believed that greater cooperation could exist between the two 
Germani es if diplomatic coexistence became the established policy. This course of 
action "belatedly recognized Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe" and propelled West 
· Germany into a higher status in international affairs. 132 Brandt believed that detente 
was possible, and he led the Federal Republic's efforts toward this goal. 
In the early 1970s, Brandt created the primary arguments in favor of 
Ostpolitik. He believed th�t realism and communication should be the basis for all 
politics between the East and West. Brandt argued that ''the realities of the postwar 
settlement should be accepted." 133 He also favored increased communication between 
Eastern and Western powers because he believed that this could lead to the saturation 
of Western ideas into the communist East, which would lead to gradual changes. 
Brandt also believed that the West's security interests must be acknowledged in 
relation to the East's interests if ''the realities of power politics" were going to change. 
Brandt believed that recognizing the current state of affairs was the first step to 
transforming East-West relations. Part of acknowledging the status quo was to 
reassure the Soviet Union that it was the predominant force in Eastern Europe. Brandt 
thought that Moscow would be more willing to communicate with the West if Soviet 
leaders were not constantly fearful about being forced out of East Germany and then 
132 Gottfried Niedhart, "Ostpolitik: The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Process of 
Detente," in 1968: The World Transformed, eds. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 173. 
133 "Ostpolitik: The Role of the Federal Republic ofGennany in the Process ofDetente," 175. 
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out of Eastern Europe. Ostpolitik also led to the acknowledgement that ''the division 
of Germany would last as long as the division ofEurope."134 Finally, Brandt believed 
that the Federal Republic should be treated as an adult within the Western community 
because it had been integrated into the West and it should now be able to "' look after 
its [own] interests with respect to the East in a more vigorous way."' 135 
It is within this context of Ostpolitik that relations between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic progressed from the early 
1970s until the late 1970s when the question of intermediate-range missiles came to 
the forefront in East-West relations. This issue arose in earnest in October 1 979 when 
Brezhnev, at a meeting in East Berlin, "made a much-publicized offer to reduce the 
nwnber of his country's intermediate-range missiles provided that the West abandoned 
all consideration of its own INF deployments." 1�6 The German Democratic Republic 
also supported this proposal. This is evident from a letter written by Erich Honecker, 
the leader of East Germany, on October 12, 1979, to Helmut Schmidt, the current 
Social Democrat Chancellor of West Germany. In the letter Honecker "emphasized 
that any NATO decision to station the INF forces on German soil would 'necessarily 
have negative consequences for relations between the GDR and the FRG. "' 1 37 
Honecker's support may have been an act of conforming to expected behavior for a 
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country in the Soviet Bloc. But it is more likely that Honecker also worried about 
having additional Soviet nuclear missiles deployed in East Germany because more 
missiles would make the GDR an even greater target if the West decided upon a 
nuclear attack. The Soviet Union's leadership told Honecker that ifNATO chose to 
deploy missiles, the exact number deployed in West Germany would be stationed by 
the Soviet Union in East Germany. 138 Leaders in the German Democratic Republic 
"chose to underscore their regret at the extent to which the 'so hopeful' developments 
between the German[ies] had been threatened by international tensions."139 This tame 
language was very different from the harsh words that Moscow had for the West 
German government's role in the intermediate nuclear missiles debate. 140 In spite of 
this, Schmidt tried to stave off the end of detente. 141 President Jimmy Carter of the 
United States knew that the issue of nuclear missiles in West Germany could be a 
divisive issue, not only between the two superpowers but also between the Federal 
Republic and the United States. 142 This awareness did not help to defuse the issue. 
By the early 1980s there was a clear rift between the United States and the Soviet 
Union over the number of missiles that could remain deployed in the two Germanies. 
The issue of nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic and in the German 
Democratic Republic became even more important when President Ronald Reagan 
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proposed the "zero option" on November 18, 1981. 143 The "zero option" stated that 
"If the Soviet Union would agree to dismantle its SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s, NATO 
would cancel deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles."144 The Soviet Union 
flatly rejected the plan arguing that it was ''pure propaganda" based on "absolutely 
fantastic facts."145 The primary problem was over the definition of what constituted 
an equal number of intermediate range missiles in Europe and the boundaries of 
Europe. The Soviet Union believed that British and French weapons should be 
included in the total number allowed in Europe for the West. 146 The United States 
disagreed with this definition because nuclear missiles inside the Soviet Union itself 
were excluded since leaders in Moscow said they were not technically in Europe. In 
1978, the Soviet Union had deployed fifty SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. By the 
end of 1981, two hundred fifty SS-20s were present in countries belonging to the 
Soviet Bloc. 147 The West had not sent any new missiles during this time period. 148 
Given these new additions in the East, the two superpowers did not have equal 
numbers of missiles in Europe. After the Soviet Union had fortified its East European 
arsenal, Brezhnev decided on March 16, 1982, to declare a moratorium on stationing 
new intermediate· missiles in Europe. 149 In response to Brezhnev's action, "In 
Washington, President Reagan said that the moratorium proposal did not go far 
143 Jeffrey Herf, War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the 
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enough and that it would leave a large Soviet arsenal intact." 150 Prior to these 
negotiations, many other options had been explored and dismissed, primarily by the 
Soviets. 
One well-publicized example was the so-called "walk in the woods 
agreement," which occurred in the summer of 1982. 1 5 1  This particular arrangement 
occurred between the United States Ambassador Paul Nitze and the Soviet Union's 
negotiator, Juri Kvitsinsky. 1 52 The two men decided to present to their respective 
governments a package which stated that "the United States and the USSR would each 
have 225 long-range intermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missile launchers and aircraft 
in Europe; each would be limited to a ceiling of 7 5 LRINF missile launchers in 
Europe."1 53 Further conditions were that the United States could only deploy cruise 
missiles while the Soviet Union could simply send ballistic missiles. 1 54 There were 
additional limitations on the numbers of missile launchers that the Soviet Union could 
have in its eastern regions as well as limits on numbers of American and Soviet 
aircraft that could be present at a given time. 155 The Soviet Union rejected the 
agreement. Instead Moscow demanded "no U.S. deployments, no constraints on 
Soviet deployments in the Eastern USSR, radical reductions in dual-capability aircraft, 
and full adherence to the principle of equality and parity."1 56 These were demands 
that the United States could not agree to follow. 
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The unacceptable proposals continued back and forth from both sides, as each 
said that the other was trying to gain superiority over the world. 157 Meanwhile, a 
political change occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1983 election. 
According to Jeffrey Herf, "The election of March 6 was a turning point in postwar 
history and a continuation of the reversal in the regional balance of forces in Europe 
that Helmut Schmidt had set in motion in October 1977."158 Helmut Kohl, leader of 
the Christian Democrat Union, or CDU, became the new Chancellor of the Federal 
Republic. Kohl had campaigned in support of the United States deployments and a 
stronger alliance between the United States and West Germany. 159 By contrast, the 
Social Democrats were clear in their desire to stop the planned missile deployment. 160 
West German voters had decided in favor of the leader and the party who urged for the 
acceptance of the missiles. 
While new leadership took over in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Soviet Union took advantage of the situation and "By March 1 983, the Soviets had 
deployed 35 1 SS-20s, with 1053 warheads, and no new American missiles had 
arrived."161 Another series of proposals ensued, were rejected by either side, and the 
Soviet Union continued to insist that equal numbers of missiles must include those of 
Great Britain and France. 162 At the same time that the negotiations continued, the 
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Social Democrats debated how they would vote on the euromissile question at a 
meeting in Cologne. While former Chancellor Schmidt wanted to blame the Soviet 
Union for the East-West conflict, the overwhelming majority of the other delegates 
decided to vote against the deployment of new American missiles in the Federal 
Republic. 163 The final vote was held in the Bundestag on November 22, 1983. 164 In 
this vote, "All 286 members of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition voted in favor of the 
resolution, while 226 Social Democrats and Green members voted against it."165 
Arrivals of the Pershing Ils began the next weekend. 166 
Once this occurred amidst the crisis, the German Democratic Republic started 
actively seeking to preserve its ties, especially for economic reasons, to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 167 East Germany tried to "downplay the significance of the 
deployment" while the Soviet Union tried to penalize West Germany. 168 At other 
times the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union had not been on the 
same page even during the euromissiles controversy. While both countries believed 
that the level of security needed to increase along the East European border, their 
reasons for this varied. 169 The Soviets desired greater security in this area because it 
"worried in particular about both Chinese militarism and the potential that the FRO 
would gain nuclear capabilities of its own."170 East German leaders wanted a more 
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secure and static region because they were concerned about "protection against the 
flow of human beings-either a flow of West Germans into the GDR, thanks to 
improved transit and visitation rights; or a flow of East German out of the GDR, via 
cooperation with all those new capitalist visitors. "171 While both had the same goal, 
their justifications were quite different. This example demonstrates the existence of a 
divergence of ideas over how the German Democratic Republic should be run between 
the leaders of the Soviet Union and those of East Germany. These divisions increased 
for a brief period in 1983 and 1984 before the Soviet Union ended such blatantly 
independent foreign policy gestures by the GDR toward the Federal Republic. 
While these actions were wildly outside the norm for a country within the 
Soviet Bloc, the German Democratic Republic likely felt an attempt to salvage ties to 
West Germany was vitally necessary and justified given the GDR's declining 
economy. Surprisingly, "Economic links between both German states flourished 
during the early 1980s, most dramatically with Bonn's two DM 1 billion credits to 
East Berlin in 1983-1984."172 Political and diplomatic issues, such as a combined 
Germany or a renewal of German national unity, were pragmatically dismissed by 
West Gennany and East Germany. 173 Instead, the two countries focused on "their 
joint commitment to the preservation of peace and cooperation in Europe."174 While 
the Soviet Union initially tolerated this type of behavior by the German Democratic 
Republic, its patience finally ended when Honecker planned to visit the Federal 
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Republic in September 1984. 175 Honecker's trip was "postponed" with no further 
explanation. 176 The visit' s goal was to have been ''to signal mutual German 
determination to construct an island of detente in Central Europe, a 'coalition of 
reason' in an implied sea of irrationality."177 Instead, in October 1984, Gromyko, then 
the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, rebuked the East German leadership's 
separate policies. In the keynote address for the October Revolution's anniversary, 
Gromyko ''warned 'revanchists' (the West Germans) and 'semi-revanchists' (the East 
Germans) 'of all stripes, wherever they are' (in either Bonn or East Berlin) that 'the 
German Reich (not just Hitler's Third Reich, but any hope for a unified German state) 
burned to the ground in the fire of the Second World War. There is no return to it, nor 
will there be."'178 Such language left nothing to the imagination. The Soviet Union 
had clearly had enough of even mildly independent East German foreign policies. The 
euromissiles controversy brought to the surface some budding issues of conflict 
between the leaders in East Berlin and Moscow, but by the end of 1984, these had 
died. 1 79 
Before the October 1984 speech by Gromyko, the German Democratic 
Republic had tried to accommodate its Soviet allies while also trying to maintain 
economic support from the Federal Republic. East Germany's support for the Soviet 
Union took various forms. One example is that in 1983 and after, the German 
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Democratic Republic's government began to praise peace and the actions taken by the 
Soviet Union to create peace. While these statements might technically have been true 
if they were published in December 1983, they would not have been valid prior to that 
time. The GDR Peace Council literature discussed in the previous chapter continually 
blamed Western powers for the lack of peace. Yet from 1979 until November 1983, 
the West tried to reach peaceful solutions. Only after all these attempts had failed, the 
United States deployed Pershing II missiles with authorization from the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
As this chapter has discussed, this event provided a short-lived turning point 
for the German Democratic Republic. For much of 1984, East German leaders 
followed their own foreign policy, diverging from the Soviet line in some areas. After 
Gromyko's speech stopped this type of action immediately, it took the appointment of 
a new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1985 before the two countries began to 
closely plan their foreign trade again. 180 Shortly after Gorbachev took the top office, 
he decided to reopen the intermediate nuclear force (INF) negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 181 In spite of the East German leadership's 1984 
rebuke by the Soviet Union, "policymakers in the GDR and the FRG were already 
prepared to enter into a qualitatively new stage in their relations" before the new INF 
meetings began. 182 To maintain the economic benefits of the relationship, leaders of 
the German Democratic Republic understood that certain accommodations had to be 
180 "East German foreign and security interests," 1 16-1 17. 
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made to ensure Bonn's goodwill. 183 At the same time, East German leadership 
worked to remain within the lines of acceptable foreign policy that were drawn so 
firmly by the Soviet Union. Concurrently, changes within East Germany, and the 
ongoing development of the actors of the independent peace movements, would now 
become a factor. 
183 
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Chapter 5 
The Pockets of Resistance Become One Mass Movement 
The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union in 
1985 ushered in a new era of changes, the significance of which can still be seen 
today, though other transformations were tal<lng place even before then: "The Charter 
77 movement in Czechoslovakia, the Polish Solidarnosc (Solidarity) union, and the 
German peace movement[ s] fought not just for the recovery of civil rights but also for 
the construction of a new form of civic self-organization."184 Prior to these events, the 
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 led many East Germans to feel trapped while 
the Prague Spring of 1968 provided a brief flicker of hope that the system could 
change before Soviet tanks rolled in to snuff it out. This long series of events on the 
international stage, in addition to a stagnating economy, loss of faith in the state's 
ability to effectively govern, and gradual erosion of control by the Soviet Union led to 
the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989. 
However, one thing is clear: the events of 1989 would have been impossible if 
the framework for dissent in the German Democratic Republic had not been 
previously established. The leaders of the independent peace movements were the 
groundbreakers who accomplished this great feat. Leaders such as Eppelmann, 
Eigenfeld, and Wollenberger wrote letters, organized marches, led small meetings and 
larger rallies, and learned how to utilize the Western media to further their causes. In 
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doing so, they learned how to mobilize people, build coalitions, all the basics of 
leadership, and the political strategies for targeting the concerns and ideas of their 
fellow citizens. They also discovered that it was possible to oppose the state and 
survive, though arrests and torture were likely to be the penalty for such behavior. In 
spite of this, they refused to let such obstacles stand in their way. 
Eppelmann and Eigenfeld, already discussed in detail above, were chosen for 
case studies because each had different motivations for participation in the 
independent peace movements. Also, each became a leader or co-founder of groups 
that made 1989 a historical turning point. Eppelmann was a founding member of 
Democratic Awakening, which was "the only large opposition group that made initial 
references to a 'reform of socialism."' 1 85 For his part, Eigenfeld helped to create New 
Forum, formed by people from various cities who wrote and disseminated copies of 
the New Forum appeal, which stated that they ''wanted to address all those who 
wanted to stay, all those who wanted to fight for a transformation of the existing 
society," rather than simply emigrating to West Germany. 186 This call for reform was 
typical among leaders of the independent peace movements of the early 1980s. While 
some of the members wanted to leave East Germany, these leaders chose to stay to 
fight for reform. 
By contrast, the case of Vera Wollenberger, "one of the founders of the 
antiestablishment 'church from below,"' is significantly different. 1 87 She and many 
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other well-known critics were expelled from the German Democratic Republic at the 
beginning of 1988. 188 Such measures were taken by the state in order to "quell 
discontent among its artistic community and churches. " 189 Prior to her expulsion to 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Wollenberger participated in the independent peace 
movements of the early 1 980s as well as being involved in a nongovernmental 
women's group, which formed out of a larger independent peace movement group, 
demonstrating "growing opposition to the ruling power structures" in the early 
1980s. 190 She continued to work in and lead similar organizations until 1 988. The 
work of Wollenberger and other women like her increasingly provided East German 
women with their own voice regarding their fears and concerns as well as the hopes 
for change that they shared with the other members of the group. 
Beyond each of these brief case studies of leadership figures, there are 
hundreds of others who also led the oppositional movements as well as the thousands 
who participated in these activities. Any of them could have been chosen as a case 
study and though their stories would be different, the overarching theme of civic 
participation to create change would be pervasive. Eppelmann, Eigenfeld, and 
Wollenberger were chosen because of their early and later leadership roles as well as 
the availability of resources that provided for a more in-depth analysis of their reasons 
for participation and the methods they used. While each of these leaders was 
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important in the creation of opposition to the state, one event was a necessary 
precursor to the independent peace movements: the INF debate. 
The role of the intermediate nuclear force controversy was an important and 
yet unlikely link in the chain of events leading to a mass movement from below in the 
German Democratic Republic. Without the INF debate of 1979 until 1983, the 
independent peace movements would not have had a single issue to rally behind. The 
desire for peace and an end to nuclear weapons in East Germany led a variety of 
different individuals to join an oppositional group and become involved. The agendas 
of these groups spread beyond the urgent cause of peace. They became places in 
which the attendees had a voice. Their remarks did not follow the party line, and for 
many this was the first time they had shared such ideas with anyone outside of their 
immediate family. The psychological effects of such acts were significant. While the 
independent peace movements existed in many forms, the most common was a small 
group where such personal contact and empowerment was maximized. Examples of 
the small groups were the women's groups that Vera Wollenberger participated in as 
well as the slightly larger though still relatively small group originally organized and 
led by Ruth Misselwitz which Wollenberger also attended. Another example was the 
small group, which first focused on peace and later on the environment, that Frank 
Eigenfeld organized, participated in, and led. Together the groups provided small 
pockets of dissent throughout East Germany. 
After the INF controversy had been settled, the state took over the issue of 
peace and formed the GDR Peace Council in an effort to calm dissent. While the state 
was largely successful in making the cause of peace its own on a rhetorical level, other 
----------------------1-,---------------------........ 
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concerns, such as human rights and the environment, took the place of peace for 
dissenting groups. Small groups formed around these causes, and opposition from 
below continued throughout the 1980s. Unfortunately this time period has been 
largely ignored in the historiography. Many historians have chosen to focus on the 
larger, denser opposition activities in 1988 and 1 989. These events are also very 
important, but it is unlikely that they would have been so effective in such a short 
period of time if the tools learned and applied to later movements by the leaders of the 




The independent peace movements that appeared from 1979-1983 in the 
German Democratic Republic provided the necessary skills and mindset for the later 
successful opposition movements of 1989. In particular, the case studies of 
Eppelmann and Eigenfeld demonstrated that the movements taught them how to 
organize and mobilize people toward a specific cause. Meanwhile, the case study of 
Wollenberger showed that many East German citizens even in the early 1980s did not 
know how to lead small groups or how to voice their opinions in public, but 
Wollenberger also proved that these skills could be learned. All three case studies 
established that citizens did not always agree with the state's actions, but until the 
independent peace movements provided a foundation or possibility for doing so, many 
had no idea how they could effectively voice their dissent. 
The creation of the independent peace movements, while furnishing a forum 
for discussion about political and social issues, also slowly created a greater level of 
"free space" within the Lutheran churches. This was not universally true, but many 
more churches opened their doors to opposition groups from 1979 on. There are 
numerous levels on which this was an important development. Lutheran churches 
often had to defend the independent peace movements against the government. By 
doing this, certain Lutheran churches, intentionally in some cases and unintentionally 
in others, became sites where dissent against the government was tolerated, at least in 
relative terms. The independent peace movements pushed this "free space" at times, 
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but they also made many churches aware that citizens had numerous ideas that could 
not be voiced anywhere else. This new consciousness because of the actions of the 
independent peace movements meant that when issues about the environment, human 
rights, and other problems were raised in the mid-to-late 1980s, more and more 
Lutheran churches contributed space for oppositionists. This became very important 
in 1988 and 1989 because without these locations, which were relatively protected 
from the Stasi, it is unlikely that the "revolution" of 1989 would have been cohesive 
enough to succeed. The independent peace movements forced Lutheran churches' 
hands, and some of the churches responded with meeting space, which set a new 
precedent. 
While the independent peace movements were important in this way, they 
were not entirely protected from harassment and arrests, as previously discussed. The 
movements were also just that: plural entities and not one united effort. For this 
reason, the German Democratic Republic was able to supersede the independent 
groups and create the official, government-sanctioned East German peace movement. 
This movement did not have to worry about the Stasi because it was state sponsored 
and organized. The East German peace movement was successful because members 
of the socialist party and trade unions all participated in marches, rallies, and letter 
writing. The united movement spoke often about peace and linked it to the German 
Democratic Republic and its public relations initiatives, yet very little was really done 
to create peace. Instead, the East German peace movement was an effective tool for 
quickly quieting true dissent over a debatable topic. 
75 
The issue of peace was quite controversial in the early 1980s because of the 
INF debate, in which the United States and the Soviet Union argued over the number 
of intermediate nuclear weapons that could be deployed in the two Germanies. After a 
decision had been reached in 1983, the anti-nuclear argument, which was inherently 
linked to the independent peace movements, temporarily became a non-issue. Most of 
those involved in these movements moved to the issues of greater human rights and a 
cleaner environment. In spite of this, the official East German peace movement 
ensured that peace would not continue as a focal point for dissent. This was an 
important development for the government because while the state often said it 
believed in creating peace, it did very little to achieve this. In fact, the positioning of 
intermediate range nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union was contrary to the idea of 
peace and demonstrated a blatant contradiction in the GDR's policies, which strongly 
advocated world-wide peace. 
While the official East German peace movement was successful in turning 
peace into a state-controlled cause, the government was less effective in actually 
ending dissent by its citizens, which demonstrated the increasing space for dissent 
which the independent peace movements had created. The independent peace 
movements demonstrated that opposition existed, that some Lutheran churches would 
provide meeting space for these dissenters, and that many believed change might 
actually come if the citizens were able to convince the government of other ideas. The 
independent groups also gave many a voice as well as leadership and organizational 
skills that they would not have acquired otherwise. Most of these participants were 
unwilling to give up their new voice, and those who found the courage to lead also 
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refused to let go of this new, important tool in their fight to change the system. The 
"bloodless revolution" would probably have taken place without the independent 
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